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INTRODUCTION
When the first modern patent laws were enacted during the Industrial
Revolution, states were able to engage in the regulatory design process under
conditions of high sovereignty. The patent system was expected to promote
domestic industrialization, so the law was constructed along these lines. Ever since,
states have continuously relinquished that sovereignty in the name of international
commerce and trade. The growing opportunities for multinational companies to
exploit their intellectual assets on international markets has given rise to persistent
lobbying1 toward the development of common rules, procedures, and minimum
standards of intellectual property (‘IP’) protection. Today, states face an intricate
legal regime made up of multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements, which set
more and more limits to their regulatory autonomy.

* Matthias Lamping is Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and
Competition, Munich, and lecturer at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich and the EuropaKolleg, Hamburg.
** Reto M. Hilty is Director of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Full
Professor ad personam at the University of Zurich, and Honorary Professor at the LudwigMaximilians-University of Munich.
1. See 2 WILLIAM A. FENNELL & JOSEPH W. TYLER, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2249 et seq. (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993); Peter Drahos, Global
Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT, 13 PROMETHEUS 62 (1995); PETER
DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM (2002); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK &
ROBERT HOWSE, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 406 et seq. (2d ed. 2002); DUNCAN
MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 et seq. (2002); SUSAN K. SELL,
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).
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The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights2
(‘TRIPS Agreement’) marks a milestone in the evolution of that regime.3 Unlike
prior conventions,4 which operated on the basis of reciprocity and thus left national
sovereignty largely intact, the TRIPS Agreement introduced a very concrete notion
of IP protection into international—and, consequently, national—law. The
preamble to the TRIPS Agreement recognizes that IP rights are private rights,
thereby implying that they ought to be protected by some sort of property right. The
TRIPS Agreement even tells states how to define such rights in terms of the subject
matter, the requirements and the scope of protection, and the exceptions and
limitations thereto. In doing so, it wields considerable influence on how
governments regulate their national innovation markets. Despite its roots in
international trade law,5 TRIPS is much more about market regulation than trade
liberalization;6 it is far more intrusive on states’ sovereignty than what would have
been necessary in light of its overarching objective—i.e., liberalizing international
trade by internalizing cross-border externalities.7

2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
3. See William Cornish & Kathleen Liddell, The Origins and Structure of the TRIPS Agreement,
in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES 4 et seq. (Hanns Ullrich et al. eds.,
2016).
4. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at
Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886; International Convention for the Protection
of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S.
43; Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1483.
5. The TRIPS Agreement is part of Annex 1 to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], just like the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 [hereinafter GATT] and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr.
15, 1994 [hereinafter GATS].
6. See William Cornish & Kathleen Liddell, supra note 3, at 3 et seq.; Hanns Ullrich, The Political
Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES,
supra note 3, at 85 et seq.; Josef Drexl, The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in
Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES,
supra note 3, at 53 et seq.; Matthias Lamping, Intellectual Property Harmonization in the Name of Trade, in
TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 313 et seq.
7. Without harmonization, countries could free ride on the innovative capacities of others while
not contributing to the social costs entailed in the development of these capacities (including access
restrictions and, concomitantly, higher prices for IP protected goods and services). In theory, this
distorts the conditions of interstate competition, because countries with weak(er) IP systems benefit
from positive externalities created in countries with strong(er) IP systems. Harmonization levels the
playing field by internalizing these cross-border externalities. This is also part of the explanation for
why the TRIPS Agreement follows a minimum standards approach. If the goal is to internalize positive
externalities, there is no need to worry about other countries granting too much protection.
Unfortunately, this is likely to create a vicious circle. As soon as a country raises its level of protection
beyond the agreed standards, it creates new positive externalities to its detriment. It will therefore try
to induce other states to also raise their level of protection by arguing that this is the only way to restore
the fairness of interstate competition and international trade. See infra note 20.
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Although countries have learned to live with the TRIPS Agreement, none
seem to be particularly happy with it.8 For the industrialized world, the World Trade
Organization (‘WTO’)—which is responsible for the administration of the
Agreement—has proven to be a brake as much as it used to be an accelerator. After
the collapse of the Ministerial Conferences at Seattle in 1999 and Cancún in 2003,
most developed countries turned their backs on the multilateral approach and
pursued bilateral and regional free trade agreements (‘FTAs’) among like-minded in
order to further their interests in strong patent protection.9 In turn, developing
countries soon began to regret the horse trade they had concluded by committing
themselves to increase their level of protection in return for a mere promise of
market access (mainly to textile, apparel, and agriculture markets)10 and a distant
hope for technology transfer (mainly through trade in capital and technology goods,
foreign direct investments, and licensing).11 During the Uruguay Round, the TRIPS
Agreement was propagated as a means to bridging the innovation gap between the
developed and the developing world.12 Today, it is increasingly suspected of having
mainly served mercantilist interests of a few advanced economies.13 Although
economists support the view that stronger patent protection can be associated with
an increase in foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) and inbound licensing,14 there are
8.

See, e.g., GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION
THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 14 et seq.
(2012); Graham Dutfield, North/South: An Asymmetric Global Market?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND MARKET POWER 180 et seq. (Gustavo Ghidini & Luis Mariano Genovesi eds., 2008); Peter K. Yu,
Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in 4 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 73, 77 et seq.
(Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
9. See JOSEF DREXL, HENNING GROSSE RUSE-KHAN & SOUHEIR, EU BILATERAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? (2014); Henning Grosse
Ruse-Khan et al., Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 44
INT ’ L REV. INTELL. PROP. COMP. L. 878 (2013); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical
Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011).
10. See DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 8, at 32; KEITH E. MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS
AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 95 (2012); Thomas Dreier, Shaping a Fair International IPR-Regime in a Globalized World:
Some Parameters for Public Policy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 43, 50 (Inge Govaere & Hanns Ullrich eds., 2007).
11. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods
and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 11 (Keith E. Maskus
& Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
12. See Daniel Gervais, Current Issues in International Intellectual Property Norm-Making, in EU
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? 5
( Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2014).
13. See, e.g., RICHARD NEWFARMER ET AL., GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR THE WORLD’S POOR 129 (2002); Phillip
McCalman, Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent Harmonization, 55 J.
INT ’ L ECON. 161 (2001).
14. See Lee Branstetter et al., Intellectual Property Rights, Imitation, and Foreign Direct Investment:
Theory and Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13033, 2007); Amy Jocelyn
OF TRIPS:
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not many signs of increased domestic innovation, technology transfer, or learning
spillovers in the developing world.15 The policy implications of patent protection in
areas such as health, nutrition or education are, on the other hand, quite
conspicuous.16
The evolution of international patent law is compounded by increasing
imbalances and dysfunctionalities within the patent system itself.17 In recent
decades, the position of patentees has continuously been reinforced: the burdens
and costs for applicants have been reduced, international prosecution has been
facilitated, the subject matter of rights has been expanded, the scope of protection
has been extended, and enforcement measures have been strengthened. On the
other hand, the rights and interests of all others affected by the system—
competitors, scientists, users, consumers, and the public at large—are rarely
attended to. Thanks to its intriguing simplicity, the fallacy of more protection equals
more innovation continues to exert a seemingly magical attraction on policymakers
worldwide. The assumption that exclusivity is better at promoting innovation than
competition is probably one of the biggest and most disconcerting misconceptions
of modern patent law and policy—and yet, strong patent protection remains at the
core of most legislators’ innovation agenda.
While strong patent protection can be conducive to the development of an
economy or industry, it can also have the opposite effect. Patent systems are

Glass & Kamal Saggi, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 56 J. INT’L ECON. 387 (2002);
Pamela J. Smith, How Do Foreign Patent Rights Affect U.S. Exports, Affiliate Sales and Licenses?, 55 J.
INT ’ L ECON. 411 (2001).
15. See MASKUS, supra note 10, at 314. However, in the vast majority of cases, this does not
come as a surprise. Knowledge is a good to be collected, not a debt to be provided. Technology transfer
across borders will only take place where the receiving country offers attractive innovation and
investment conditions. Patent rights can be an effective means of supporting FDI and inbound
licensing, but they are only one—very often overestimated—element in a far broader set of influences
that define the attractiveness of a foreign market, including political and social stability, taxation,
investment law, commercial and corporate law, trade law, the labour market, or competition law. See
Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and
Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT ’ L L. 109 (1998). For empirical evidence, see Edwin
Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment, Technology Transfer, and
Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 140 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993).
16. In order to address the concerns of the developing world, the Ministerial Conference at
Doha in 2001 launched the Doha Development Agenda. Although the overall progress on the ground
seems to have been rather modest, developing countries have had at least some success in consolidating
what is left of their regulatory autonomy in relation to certain critical public goods, such as health care.
See WTO, Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 14 Nov. 2001, ¶¶ 17 et seq., WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002); WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, adopted on 14 Nov. 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 ILM 755 (2002); WTO,
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
Decision of the General Council of 30 Aug. 2003, WTO Doc. WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003).
17. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS —HOW
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT (2004).
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regulatory institutions. Countries have different needs, aspirations, and capabilities,
and thus different views on the goals and priorities of their patent systems—e.g.,
increasing innovation, enhancing economic efficiency, encouraging technology
transfer and dissemination, supporting domestic industries, attracting foreign
investors, making trade gains, or avoiding trade losses. Depending on their levels of
development, countries also have different views on the optimal level of protection.
Economic evidence may be rare, but history speaks a clear language: it is a historical
fact that the level of protection declines “as economies move beyond the poorest
stage into a middle-income stage in which they have greater abilities to imitate” and
then increases again as they become “more innovative at the highest levels of
income.”18 With little to no prospect of gaining a comparative advantage as a
technology producer (and exporter), a country will presumably have little to no
interest in providing a high level of protection for technologies of which it will
remain an imitator in the foreseeable future.19 In their own best interests, most
WTO member states would thus arguably, if they were not forced to do otherwise,
provide weaker patent protection than what their more advanced trading partners
consider “effective” and “adequate” from a—or rather, their—trade perspective.20
Lastly, states may also have different views on the nature of intellectual property as
a social institution,21 its relation to other public policies, and its hierarchical status
within the canon of constitutional rights.
The extent to which sovereign states can go their own way—by defining their
own laws and policies—depends on the obligations they have assumed under
international law. In the patent context, international law determines specific
minimum standards of protection, but devotes—if at all—only cursory attention to
the flip side of the coin, namely the protection of those whose freedom to operate
is restrained by the exclusionary right granted to the patent holder.22 Because the
18. Keith E. Maskus, The International Regulation of Intellectual Property, 134
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 186, 192 (1998); see also B. Zorina Khan, Intellectual Property and
Economic Development: Lessons from American and European History (Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights, Study Paper 1a, 2002); Nagesh Kumar, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and
Economic Development: Experiences of Asian Countries (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
Study Paper 1b, 2002); NEWFARMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 139 et seq.
19. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 1, at 314; Maskus & Reichman, supra note 11, at 10.
20. The problem here is that the “marriage of convenience” (see supra note 7) between patent
and trade law creates an artificial dependency between the due level of national patent protection and
the functioning of the international trading system. This shifts the perspective from what is considered
“effective” and “adequate” (see preamble to the TRIPS Agreement) in terms of national innovation
policy to what is considered “effective” and “adequate” in terms of international commerce and trade—
i.e., from the perspective of more innovative countries that have adopted strong(er) patent systems and
are therefore creating positive externalities for countries with weak(er) patent systems. From their point
of view, any level of patent protection lower than what they consider appropriate for themselves would
allegedly be “ineffective” and “inadequate” in terms of international trade. See Lamping, supra note 6, at
344 et seq.
21. See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996).
22. See Annette Kur, From Minimum Standards to Maximum Rules, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM
TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 133 et seq.; Annette Kur & Henning Grosse
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provisions of international IP treaties like the Paris Convention23 and the TRIPS
Agreement are frequently open-textured—or at least constructively ambiguous—
and therefore generally leave to states considerable discretion regarding their
implementation,24 it is important to be clear about the exact scope of that discretion.
States need to know all their options in order to make informed policy choices. At
the end of the day, it is their responsibility to ensure that the patent system works
in harmony with the market economy it is supposed to serve, without encroaching
upon the social order within which it is embedded.
In view of these considerations, a multinational group of patent scholars has
taken up the challenge to rebut the widespread assumption that the TRIPS
Agreement requires states to implement a high level of patent protection and leaves
little space for pursuing national public interest goals. The work of this group
culminated in a document that marks the interpretive borders of the international
patent regime: the Declaration on Patent Protection25 (‘Patent Declaration’). The
Patent Declaration seeks to clarify some of the regulatory options that states retain
with regard to the design of their patent systems. It is ultimately about sovereignty
and the right to self-government. Its aim is to make policymakers, legislators, courts,
and other authorities involved in the administration of the patent system aware of
the fact that the TRIPS Agreement gives them much more leeway than commonly
assumed—i.e., that there are many ways to pursue national interests without
violating international law.
I. METHODOLOGY
The Patent Declaration is an apolitical, minimalistic approach to the
interpretation of the obligations that international law imposes on states. In order
to elucidate the methodology behind the Declaration, it appears instructive to focus
on what the Patent Declaration is not rather than what it is:
(1) The Patent Declaration is not a political paper. It supports the position of
neither developed nor developing countries. Both sides will occasionally be faced
with dysfunctionalities within the patent system and imbalances between the rights
and obligations conferred with a patent. Accordingly, both sides will occasionally
have to reconsider their laws and legal practice in order to bring their systems back
on track. It would be a capital mistake to assume that the regulatory leeway
Ruse-Khan, Enough is Enough—The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property
Protection, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM OF TRIPS 359 et seq. (Annette Kur & Marianne Levin eds., 2011).
23. See supra note 4.
24. See ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1278
(9th ed. 1992), for a definition of the principle of in dubio mitius, which demands that if the meaning
of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which limits the sovereignty of the obliged party
less. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 165,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998).
25. Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, 45 INT ’ L REV. INTELL.
PROP. COMPETITION L. 679 (2014) [hereinafter Patent Declaration].
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determined by the Patent Declaration is only relevant for developing countries that
have no ambitions of becoming innovative themselves.
(2) The Patent Declaration should not be understood as a menu of policy
recommendations. The focus on what could be done as opposed to what should be
done is a matter of methodology and should not be mistaken for a political
statement. The Patent Declaration demonstrates policy space available to states.
However, it does not provide policy advice. Whether it is advisable or, indeed,
beneficial—in terms of innovation, development, or any other conceivable policy
objective—to make use of the regulatory leeway identified in the Patent Declaration
can only be answered in consideration of the concrete circumstances of the
individual case. Without knowledge of the technological capabilities as well as the
socioeconomic needs and priorities of a country, it is impossible to give a serious
answer to the question of which options should be implemented and how they
should be combined in order to best promote the objectives attached to the national
patent system. Whether leeway is available is a matter of legal interpretation;
whether it is sensible to exploit such is a matter of political preferences. The Patent
Declaration is about the former, not about the latter.
(3) The Patent Declaration does not aspire to resolve any of the constructive
ambiguities that have been built into the TRIPS Agreement. Unless a specific
meaning follows from the wording or context, member states shall adopt their own
definitions and draw their own conclusions.
(4) The Patent Declaration does not propose changes to the TRIPS
Agreement,26 and it does not reinterpret its provisions in order to create regulatory
autonomy contrary to what has been mutually agreed upon during the Uruguay
Round negotiations.
(5) The Patent Declaration is not bound by WTO jurisprudence. Even though
the rulings adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) are regarded as strong
precedents, they do not constitute an official interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement. There is no rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement.
(6) The Patent Declaration is not an academic paper. It therefore eschews
explaining the legal reasoning behind its statements and findings in greater detail.
The reason for that lies in its target audience. It is not the academic community but
primarily policymakers and legislators who are addressed. Needless to say, this does
not mean that the legal analysis has not been made. The Declaration has been
drafted on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of the TRIPS Agreement’s
negotiation history, academic literature, and WTO jurisprudence.

26. See, e.g., ANNETTE KUR & MARIANNE LEVIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A
FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF TRIPS (2011).
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II. RATIONALE
Harmonization can reduce transaction costs, but it also tends to reduce the
responsiveness of the law to the specific conditions and needs of the economy.27
What works for one country may not work for another, what works today may not
work tomorrow, and what is good for international trade is not necessarily good for
national development. Patent rights are attributed to individuals and thus protected
by exclusivity,28 but they are to ultimately serve the public good by fostering
technological progress for the benefit of society as a whole.29 This requires the rights
and obligations encompassed in a patent right to be defined, justified, and
continually reconsidered by reference to its specific socioeconomic benefits and
costs. International law should, to the extent possible, be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of the states’ freedom to weigh up the costs
and benefits of their patent system and seek, within the bounds of good faith, to
correct and prevent socioeconomic inefficiencies. Despite the need for a certain
coordination of patent policies and laws as a means of internalizing—at least
reducing—jurisdictional externalities30 and thereby facilitating international
commerce and trade, every state remains responsible for the functioning of its own
system: (1) for the functional efficiency of patent protection, and (2) for the
compatibility of patent protection with the objectives of other public policies. A
certain degree of regulatory autonomy is crucial on both counts.
Functional efficiency refers to the intrinsic functionality of the patent system
as a competition regulator. Innovation is a dynamic process driven by competitive
pressure and the prospect of temporary market exclusivity due to first-mover
advantages. The design of the patent system and the competitive order of the
affected innovation and product markets are therefore inherently interdependent.
Patents may be designed as property rights, but the patent system is not intended
to operate as a property regime. It is conceived as a “framework regulation of the
market economy.”31 The priority objective of the patent system is to preserve

27. See Matthias Lamping, supra note 6, at 313 et seq.
28. For an economic perspective, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 et seq. (Richard
Nelson ed., 1962); FRITZ MACHLUP, 1 KNOWLEDGE, ITS CREATION DISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC
SIGNIFICANCE 160 et seq. (1983); CHRISTOPHER T. TAYLOR & ZANGWILL A. SILBERSTON, THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 24 et seq.
(1973). For the theoretical fundamentals, see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,
36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
29. Think, for example, of art. 14(2) of the German Constitution, which reads: “Property entails
obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.” The programmatic beauty of this provision may
be hard to resemble in legal practice, but it has—or at least should have—a subliminal effect on the
interpretation and application of ordinary statutory law.
30. See supra note 7.
31. See Hanns Ullrich, Intellectual Property: Exclusive Rights for a Purpose—The Case of
Technology Protection by Patents and Copyright (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and
Competition Law Research Paper No. 13-01, 2012); Hanns Ullrich, Propriété Intellectuelle, Concurrence
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effective competition at the invention and innovation levels. It is supposed to
anticipate situations in which first-mover advantages could be mitigated by market
dynamics to an extent that would discourage the first mover from inventing in the
first place. Although the promotion of innovation underlines the classical rationale
of the patent system, patents are neither granted to reward the inventor nor to
encourage him to invent. Patents as such do not promote innovation—they protect
market opportunities. This protection is not about providing incentives to innovate,
but about preserving them. The main purpose of patent protection is to prevent a
market failure due to the innovation incentives of market participants being
suppressed as a result of the ability of competitors to free ride on the innovator’s
achievements—in other words, due to “chronic” inability of the market to allocate
market revenues according to market performance.32
It follows from the above that a competitive market is a prerequisite for any
patent system to operate properly, and that patent law must provide for appropriate
measures—both prior to and after the patent has been granted—to ensure that
patent protection does not interfere with the proper functioning of that market,
including all related upstream and downstream markets. In terms of regulatory
policy, this functional interdependence of the patent system and the competitive
order poses a twofold challenge that must be tackled within the parameters of
international law, in particular the TRIPS Agreement: unless there is a risk of market
failure, states should not be obliged to intervene in the innovation process, and once
granted, patent rights need to be recognized only to the extent that they do not
unduly restrain competition and innovation. Where the exclusionary effects of
patent protection go beyond what is necessary and sufficient to prevent a market
failure, the patent lacks economic legitimacy. Consequently, the functional
efficiency of a patent system will heavily depend on the specific market and
technology environment within which it is expected to operate as an incentive,
compensation, and distribution mechanism.
Besides being functionally efficient, a patent system must be in harmony with
other public policies. Due to technology’s continual expansion into more and more
spheres of life, the system’s intrinsic rationale of promoting innovation by allocating
exclusive exploitation rights is increasingly confronted with other policy objectives
and priorities. The functioning of the patent system as a social institution that
benefits society as a whole depends heavily on whether patent protection can be
reconciled with such objectives and priorities.
From a meta perspective, innovation is just one state goal among many others,
such as economic growth, employment, protecting the environment, preserving
biodiversity, sustainability, scientific progress, affordable access to health care and
et Regulation: Limites de Protection et Limites de Contrôle, in REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
ÉCONOMIQUE 399 (2009) (Fr.).
32. See Eric Hoppman, Die Funktionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs: Bemerkungen zu Kantzenbachs
Erwiderung, 3 J. ECON. & STAT. 16 et seq. (1967).
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nutrition, education, or security. The importance of such policies is explicitly
recognized in the TRIPS Agreement, which relativizes the member states’
substantive obligations by embedding them into a system of socioeconomic policy
controls.33 At the same time, however, these policy controls are made subject to
compliance with the very same provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that may be at
the root of the policy conflict.34 If this were to be interpreted restrictively (literally),
it would create a hierarchy between the standards of patent protection established
by the TRIPS Agreement and the attainment of other public policy objectives. Apart
from functional concerns, this would also be irreconcilable with the international
legal order,35 in which the TRIPS Agreement is just one treaty among many others,
all with their own goals and priorities. TRIPS requires states to protect IP according
to specific minimum standards, but it does not—and cannot—alter the status of
IP protection in relation to other public policies.36 There is no ground for
interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in a manner that generally gives patent
protection priority over other public policy objectives. This would not only be
incompatible with a series of international treaties; the policy trade-offs that such
an interpretation would necessarily presuppose were also never a subject of the
Uruguay Round negotiations.37
The consistency requirement should thus be understood as a proportionality
assessment directed against an arbitrary or excessive use of socioeconomic policy
correctives.38 If states have a legitimate reason for acting contrary to an obligation
under the TRIPS Agreement on grounds of important public interests,39 the
consistency requirement should not—and does not—prevent them from doing
33. See the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 8(1), which confirms the member states’
freedom to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development,” and art.
8(2), which states that “appropriate measures . . . may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely
affect the international transfer of technology.”
34. Both paragraphs of art. 8 of the TRIPS Agreement are only applicable to the extent that the
adopted measures “are consistent with the provisions of the Agreement.” (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (Dec. 10,
1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI)
(Dec. 16, 1966). For an extensive analysis, see Klaus D. Bieter, Establishing Conformity Between TRIPS
and Human Rights, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at
445 et seq.
36. See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 108 (2007).
37. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. & INT ’ L CTR. FOR TRADE AND
DEV. [UNCTAD/ICTSD], RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 551 et seq. (2005).
38. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 37, at 552.
39. See WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 16, ¶ 4, which
can be applied by analogy to other public policies. With regard to the legitimacy of the policy objective
pursued, see Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.69, WT/DS114/R
(adopted Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Canada—Pharmaceuticals], defining the term “legitimate interests”
as “a normative claim calling for protection of interests that are ‘justifiable’ in the sense that they are
supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.”
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such, as long as the adopted measure is: appropriate to achieve the objective
pursued; necessary to achieve the objective pursued (i.e., there are no less restrictive
means of achieving it);40 and proportional in terms of the expected benefits and
costs (i.e., all interests at stake are duly taken into account).
The proportionality assessment reflects the need for a balance between, on the
one hand, preserving member states’ freedom to “set and achieve regulatory
objectives through measures of their own choosing” and, on the other hand,
“discouraging [them] from adopting or maintaining measures that unduly restrict
trade” without serving a legitimate public policy interest.41 There should be no
doubt that, in certain situations, a coordination of conflicting public policies may
require measures that are contrary to, or at least on the brink of what can be squared
with the wording of the TRIPS Agreement. In that case, as long as the measure
adopted serves a legitimate purpose and complies with the principle of
proportionality, the end should be able to justify the means. After all, the TRIPS
Agreement must be implemented in a manner supportive of the member states’
freedom to make their own policy choices. Each member state retains the right to
define its public policy objectives and priorities,42 their relative importance, and the
desired level of attainment.43 As long as such policy choices are based on a proper
exercise of discretion,44 they should be respected.
Both in terms of functional efficiency and public policy coordination, there
are strong arguments in favour of regulatory diversity.45 The socioeconomic
implications of the patent system vary in costs and benefits by country, technology,
and over time. Patent law affects markets in a wide range of industry sectors ranging
from nutrition to banking, and it influences entrepreneurial processes throughout
the entire lifetime of a technology, from the initial investment decision through the
end of the product life cycle. The evolution of new technologies and business
models has exposed considerable differences in both the characteristics of
technologies across sectors and in how industries innovate and make use of—their
40. See Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.26, L/6439
(adopted Nov. 7, 1989) GATT BISD (36th Supp.), at 345 (1989); Appellate Body Report, Korea—
Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 161, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2001).
41. WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, “Necessity Tests” in the WTO, Note by the
Secretariat, ¶ 4, WTO Doc. S/WPDR/W/27/Add. 1 ( Jan. 18, 2011).
42. For the purposes of dispute settlement, it is not the necessity of the policy objective that can
be subject to review, but only the necessity of the measure chosen to achieve that objective. See WTO
Working Party on Domestic Regulation, supra note 41, ¶¶ 4, 14 et seq.
43. See WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, supra note 41, ¶¶ 4, 24 et seq.
44. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 37, at 127 et seq.; DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 2.86 (3d ed. 2008); CARLOS M. CORREA, supra
note 36, at 105 et seq.; NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 8.8 (3d
ed. 2010).
45. See Matthias Lamping, supra note 6, at 313 et seq.; Rupprecht Podszun & Benjamin Franz,
Regulatory Innovation and the Institutional Design of the TRIPS Agreement, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM
TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 279 et seq.
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own as well as others’—innovations on the marketplace. Every technology is more
or less unique in terms of the level of protection required to induce upfront
investments in research and development, the exceptions and limitations required
to facilitate follow-on innovation, and the impact of patent protection on the
conditions of competition on the affected markets. It is thus highly unlikely that a
uniform patent system will optimally promote efficiency and progress in the wide
range of technology sectors it is expected to cover.46 For a patent system to be
functionally efficient, in harmony with other public policies, and responsive to
changing circumstances, it must internalize the differences between technologies
and industries. This cannot be done on the basis of a “one size fits all” approach. It
rather requires the legislator’s full attention to the specific patterns of innovation
and market development in each technology sector, and to how these patterns
evolve over time.
Contrary to popular belief, differentiation is not inconsistent with international
law—actually, it is quite the contrary. According to the TRIPS Agreement, “patents
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the field
of technology.”47 At its broadest, the term discrimination covers all kinds of
differential treatment. However, this would not only jeopardize the functional
efficiency of the patent system—which requires regulatory interventions in the
market to be minimally invasive—but would also be incompatible with the concept
of discrimination implied in the national treatment and most-favoured-nation
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.48 Rather, discrimination should be interpreted
in light of the principle of equal treatment or substantive equality: Equal situations
should not be treated differently and different situations should not be treated
alike.49
With this in mind, a differential treatment of technologies, or even industries,
is not only explicitly allowed under the TRIPS Agreement, but may even be required
in order to avoid discriminatory results—i.e., in order to avoid a situation where
market effects of patent protection vary among different technologies and
industries, thereby distorting the natural competitive order of the economy as a
whole. This would be irreconcilable with the notion of the patent system as a
46. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1675 et seq. (2003).
47. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(1).
48. See Canada—Pharmaceuticals, supra note 39, ¶ 7.94.
49. See Lionel Bently et al., Standing Committee on the Law of Patents: Exclusions from Patentable
Subject Matter and Exceptions and Limitations to the Rights, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION [WIPO], 41 WIPO Doc. SCP/15/3, Annex 1 (2011); CARVALHO, supra note 44, ¶¶
27.55, 27.8; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying without Discriminating, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 445, 452 (2007); GERVAIS, supra note 44, at ¶ 2.249; CARLOS M.
CORREA, supra note 36, at 282; Thomas Cottier, From Progressive Liberalization to Progressive Regulation
in the WTO Law, 9 J. INT ’L ECON. L. 796 (2006); UNCTAD/ICTSD, supra note 37, at 368. This
interpretation of the non-discrimination requirement is also supported by the DSB. See, e.g., Canada—
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 39, ¶¶ 7.92, 7.94, 7.101.
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“framework regulation of the market economy”50 Patents ought to protect
competition as an institution—without influencing the competitive process.
CONCLUSION
Since the Renaissance, the patent system has been used by governments to
control the development of their domestic economies. They were able to adjust the
balance of static and dynamic efficiency (i.e., effectively exploiting existing
knowledge while maintaining sufficient incentives for the production of further
knowledge) in light of their current technological capabilities as well as their
socioeconomic needs and priorities. This allowed them to develop and consolidate
areas of comparative advantage in the sectors they considered to be most important
for national development. As a matter of fact, many of today’s industrialized nations
look back on a long and fruitful tradition as “imitators”.51
The evolution of the international legal regime has made it much more difficult
for states to pursue such strategies,52 but it still gives them considerable leeway in
50. See Hanns Ullrich, supra note 31.
51. See Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions:
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247 (2009); Graham Dutfield & Uma Suthersanen,
Harmonisation or Differentiation in Intellectual Property Protection? The Lessons of History, 23
PROMETHEUS 131, 135 et seq. (2005); HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER:
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 13 et seq. (2002); Linsu Kim, Technology
Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights: Lessons from Korea’s Experience (UNCTAD/ICTSD, Working
Paper Issue N. 2, 2002); Ha-Joon Chang, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development:
Historical Lessons and Emerging Issues, 2 J. HUM. DEV. 288 et seq. (2001); Jakob Tanner, The Swiss
Pharmaceutical Industry: The Impact of Industrial Property Rights and Trust in the Laboratory, 1907–
1939, in DETERMINANTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, 1900–1939
257 et seq. (Anthony S. Travis et al. eds., 1998); Cristian Simon, The Rise of the Swiss Chemical Industry
Reconsidered, in THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN EUROPE 1850–1914: INDUSTRIAL GROWTH,
POLLUTION, AND PROFESSIONALIZATION 17 et seq. (Ernst Homburg et al. eds., 1998); Jerome H.
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 NYU
J. INT ’ L L. & POL. 11 et seq. (1996); CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS?: THE RISE OF THE
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 74 et seq. (1995); Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both Diffusion and
Exclusion, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 et seq. (1991); DAVID J. JEREMY, TRANSATLANTIC INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION: THE DIFFUSION OF TEXTILE TECHNOLOGIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND AMERICA,
1790–1830S 8 et seq. (1981).
52. Whether this is a good or a bad thing is a matter of perspective. Just as imitation is an
integral part of innovation (see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
83 (5th ed. 1994)), global welfare may well benefit from the developing states temporarily free-riding
on—or, to put it in positive terms, learning from—the technological achievements of the developed
world. After all, competition is the driving force of all progress—not only within a state’s economy, but
also among states as economic actors. There may even be a role for the WTO here. The preamble to
the WTO Agreement explicitly recognizes the need for “positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth in
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.” Furthermore, it
recognizes that the relations between the member states “in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living . . . while allowing for the optimal use of
the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development.” It is obviously
difficult to derive any concrete rights or obligations from these statements, but it could be said that they
do imply a certain commitment on behalf of the more advanced economies toward actively reducing

Lamping & Hilty_First to Printer (Do Not Delete)

482

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

5/21/2017 11:37 AM

[Vol. 6:469

order to make sure that their patent systems are functionally efficient and in
harmony with other public policies. The Patent Declaration suggests that much of
the hostility shown to the TRIPS Agreement—mostly by developing countries—
may be owed to a failure to recognize the actual autonomy afforded by the
Agreement with regard to its implementation in national law.
Despite all due respect for the social, economic, and cultural needs and
aspirations of states, it would be naïve not to recognize that IP regulation can no
longer be treated as a purely domestic matter. The coalescence of national
economies has turned it into an international concern that requires collective action.
The effects of a country’s IP policy will not stop at its national borders, nor will a
country remain unaffected by repercussions of other countries’ IP policies. States
are no longer only responsible for their own people and markets, and national
markets can no longer be regulated without the involvement of multinational
public—and increasingly also private—actors. As a result of globalization, internal
market regulation has become a shared responsibility of individual nation states and
the international community of states—a responsibility that needs to be exercised
jointly, with mutual respect for both national and international concerns. For better
or worse, international politics has become an integral aspect of domestic
governance.
However, this does not mean that states should place the fate of their IP
systems into the hands of their trading partners; they should rather, wherever
possible, resist the temptation to barter their regulatory sovereignty for trade
concessions. It just means that they may occasionally have to make public policy
choices that are not fully in line with their own best interests. Nota bene, may is the
operative word here. Policy choices always involve trade-offs. International law
imposes obligations on states, but it does not—and cannot—make these trade-offs.
It does not balance producers’ and users’ interests, enhance social welfare, or
promote the functioning of national innovation markets—all of which is stated, or
at least implied,53 in the TRIPS Agreement. Making these trade-offs is not only left
to the discretion but also to the responsibility of the member states. Sovereignty
entails the freedom to choose as well as the obligation to bear the consequences. It
is certainly no panacea, but surely worth protecting as an end in itself.

the development gap. It could therefore be argued that the WTO—being a member-driven institution
built on the principle of solidarity—bears a certain responsibility for building a bridge between the
industrialized economies and those who lag behind, so that the latter can benefit from the former
without the former being exploited by the latter.
53. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at arts. 7, 8.

